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 ‘Runaway bosses’ in China: Private 
lending, credit crunches and the 
regulatory response 
 In recent years, the term ‘ pao lu lao ban’ , or ‘runaway bosses’ in English, has 
drawn intense attention from Chinese and Western media.[1] In China, it has 
been diffi  cult for privately owned businesses to obtain loans from the state-
run banking sector, as Chinese banks tend to make loans to other state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and refuse to lend to what they perceive as risky start-ups. 
Even though small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) generate 60 per 
cent of the region’s economic output and 80 per cent of all jobs, they have 
received only a fi fth of bank loans.[2] Therefore, a large number of Chinese 
entrepreneurs rely on the shadow banking system to acquire funding for their 
business ventures, and many of them have borrowed heavily from professional 
money lenders, or underground money houses, which often charge excessive 
interest of more than 20 per cent annually. With the Chinese economy 
gradually slowing down after the global fi nancial crisis, many borrowers have 
found it nearly impossible to repay private loans, as their declining businesses 
have been unable to generate enough profi t to compensate for the high cost of 
private lending.[3] As a result, China has recently witnessed frequent waves of 
private lending defaults, which have led to thousands of insolvent enterprises, 
and their management, who are heavily indebted, often choose to run away to 
evade debts. However, why those entrepreneurs regard running away, instead 
of staying and fi ling for insolvency, as an optimal choice remains unknown. 
 The objective of this article is to explore the prevailing phenomenon of 
China’s runaway bosses. The fi rst section examines China’s fugitive bosses, with 
particular reference to one case regarding a high-profi le business tycoon, Ding 
Hui. The second section will detail why Chinese private enterprises depend so 
much on private lending as a vital fi nancing source, and how private lending 
has resulted in ‘disappearing bosses’ in the economic downturn. The third 
section will introduce a pilot for fi nancial reform in east China’s Wenzhou 
city, and a newly invented registration-based system for regulating private 
lending transactions. The fi nal section will provide some closing thoughts. 
 Nuoqi’s missing chairman: A case study 
 Ding Hui has been depicted as a successful entrepreneur in China. He used 
to be the chairman, chief executive offi  cer and executive director of Fujian 
Nuoqi Co Ltd, a fashion retailor listed on the main board of the Hong Kong 
stock exchange (stock code: 1353.HK).[4] Founded in 2004, Nuoqi is based 
in south-east China’s Quanzhou city and it mainly produces and sells casual 
apparel for young and middle-aged men. Similar to other international 
clothing giants such as H&M, Zara and Gap, Nuoqi has adopted the business 
model known as ‘market-driven fast fashion’. The company was on a fast-
track expansion course for nearly a decade following its establishment. As of 
October 2013, Nuoqi had more than 400 retail points across China consisting 
of 225 self-owned, and 213 franchised, stores.[5] Moreover, it had developed a 
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prospering customer royalty programme that has attracted 
nearly 1.2 million members who made a signifi cant 
contribution to the company’s sales and provided reliable 
feedback to improve clothing design.[6] As a result, its 
outstanding customer relationship management was 
selected as a case study in the Executive Master of Business 
Administration (EMBA) programme at the Northwestern 
University Kellogg School of Management.[7] In January 
2014, Ding Hui managed to fl oat Nuoqi on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange. 
 Missing chairman and share price plummet 
 In July 2014, a rumour began to circulate in the Chinese 
security market that Ding Hui, had gone missing.[8] 
It is said that Ding Hui and his wife, Chen Ruiying, 
probably owed multimillion-dollar personal debts and 
decided to abscond. As a result, the stock market reacted 
fi ercely and Nuoqi’s share price fell by more than 50 
per cent between 21  July and 23 July. Despite the 
speculation among investors, the company appeared to 
know nothing, as Nuoqi’s board made an announcement 
on 21 July declaring that it was unaware of any reason 
for the share price fl uctuation or any other information 
which needed to be disclosed to investors according to 
Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Ordinance.[9] Later, 
on 23 July, the trading of Nuoqi’s shares was suspended at 
the request of the company after the catastrophic three-
day slump.[10] However, on 25  July Nuoqi confi rmed 
that it had not been able to contact Ding Hui for a few 
days, and the company had reported this to the Hong 
Kong police force. Ding Hui was offi  cially declared a 
‘missing person’.[11] Although the company insisted that 
it would try all available means to connect with Ding 
Hui, it continued to deny allegations of his absconding 
by saying that the rumour had not yet been verifi ed.
[12] As a temporary arrangement for the management 
of Nuoqi, Ding Canyang, an executive director who is 
also the elder brother of Ding Hui, took charge of the 
company.[13] 
 Unauthorised fi nancial activities 
 By the end of July 2014, the truth gradually emerged 
following an internal investigation by Nuoqi. The 
investigation revealed that, in early 2014, two sums of 
money – 50 million yuan (US$8.06 million) and HK$ 
19.55 million (US$2.52 million) – were transferred 
from the bank account of a subsidiary of the company, 
Nuoqi Fashion International Limited, to that of an 
irrelevant company incorporated in the British Virgin 
Islands., The transaction was instructed by Ding Hui. 
Ding Hui[14] Moreover, in January and March 2014, 
another two sums of money worth 160 million yuan 
(US$25.79 million) and 2.5 million yuan (US$403,000) 
respectively were transferred from Nuoqi’s bank account 
to a related account with the Xiamen International Bank, 
with Ding Hui’s personal permission.[15] So far, it has 
become evident that Ding Hui absconded with around 
228million yuan (US$36.75million) which is supposed 
to belong to Nuoqi. He not only breached his duty as 
director, but also stole company assets. Therefore, all of 
his positions in the company were removed by the board 
of directors.[16] 
 Worse still, the company later found that Nuoqi and 
its subsidiaries had apparently guaranteed and pledged 
securities for several loans, which collectively amounted 
to 454.5 million yuan (US$73.26 million) and had been 
borrowed by certain individuals outside the Nuoqi group.
[17] Ding Hui, without notifying the company, had used 
Nuoqi’s cash deposits as collateral against bank loans for 
his family, so Nuoqi had become liable for those debts 
when Ding Hui fl ed abroad. 
 In September 2014, Nuoqi’s chief fi nancial offi  cer 
and company secretary, Au Yeung Ho Yin, tendered his 
resignation, despite commenting that: “there is no matter 
relating to his resignation that needs to be brought to the 
attention of shareholders”.[18] However, this was the fi nal 
blow to the company’s ongoing fi nancial crisis, thus, in 
the same month Nuoqi appointed KPMG to assess and 
advise on its fi nancial situation, in order to formulate 
potential restructuring plans.[19] The story ended when, 
in March 2015, some of Nuoqi’s creditors applied to the 
court in Quanzhou city, where Nuoqi is headquartered, 
for a company reorganisation. In the following month the 
application was offi  cially accepted and an administrator 
was appointed.[20] 
 Table 1: Nuoqi timeline 
Time Event
2004 Ding Hui and his elder brother, 
Ding Canyang, co-found the 
Quanzhou City Nuoqi Company. 
2008 Quanzhou City Nuoqi is 
converted into a joint-stock 
limited liability company under 
the name of Fujian Nuoqi Co 
Ltd. It adopts a fast-fashion model 
with a membership programme 
as its market approach.
2013 Nuoqi’s retail points reach 438.
9 January 2014 Nuoqi fl oats as an IPO on the 
Hong Kong stock exchange.
21–23 July 2014 The share price of Nuoqi falls 
by 32.56%, 6.21% and 23.47% 
over three days. Trade in stock is 
suspended.
25 July 2014 Ding Hui is offi  cially declared 
‘a missing person’.
31 July 2014 Nuoqi reports four unauthorised 
transfers of funds.
19 August 2014 Nuoqi reports that it has pro-
vided unauthorised guarantees 
and collateral for non-group 
members.
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8 September 2014 Nuoqi’s CFO, Au Yeung Ho Yin, 
tenders his resignation.
October 2014 Nuoqi hires KPMG to consider 
potential restructuring plans.
April 2015 The Quanzhou Court accepts the 
application for the reorganisation 
of Nuoqi.
 Data Source: Fujian Nuoqi Co Ltd and the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange.[21] 
 Stakeholders affected 
 The story of Ding Hui is regarded as a well-prepared 
escape scheme rather than a sudden disappearance. Nuoqi 
only fl oated its shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
in January 2014, but in the following months, Ding Hui 
not only transferred the money out of the company, 
but also borrowed various bank loans by making use of 
Nuoqi’s cash deposits as collaterals. Shortly thereafter, 
he suddenly absconded. Aside from the eff ects on the 
company itself, this incident had a negative impact on a 
number of stakeholders. 
 First, shareholders and creditors are susceptible to 
enormous losses and Nuoqi’s share price decreased by 
more than half in just three days, with billions of Hong 
Kong dollars wiped out. Trading of Nuoqi has been 
suspended ever since, which means shareholders have 
had no opportunity to turn their shares into cash. The 
company also recently refused to pay dividends as it is 
on the edge of insolvency.[21] Similarly, a large number 
of Nuoqi’s creditors, which are either banks or private 
lenders, have been exposed to great losses, since it is 
currently nearly impossible for Nuoqi to repay debts. 
 Moreover, according to  Security Daily , the entire textile 
and apparel sector, which is one of the pillar industries 
in the Fujian Province (where Nuoqi’s headquarters and 
main factories are located) has been greatly aff ected by 
the incident, as banking institutions have tightened credit 
provisions to the entire industry within Fujian Province.
[23] Money lenders also act with more caution when 
they make loans to Fujian’s clothes makers, paying closer 
attention to the cash fl ow situation of potential borrowers, 
and collateral is heavily discounted to compensate for 
potential risks.[24] 
 Nuoqi’s sponsor in the IPO, CCB International (the 
investment banking unit of China Construction Bank, 
China’s second-largest lender) has also been aff ected. In 
a recent IPO of China International Capital Corp, CCB 
International was dropped from the list of underwriters 
due to the incident.[25] 
 Truth revealed 
 Despite several stakeholders suff ering as a result of Ding 
Hui’s behaviour, market watchers are still curious about 
why he would deliberately destroy his business empire. 
It makes no sense that Ding Hui simply wanted to make 
more money, prejudicing company benefi ts and relevant 
stakeholders, as he was already rich and successful, so what 
is the real story? 
 In fact, before Nuoqi’s initial public off erings on the 
Hong Kong stock exchange, Ding Hui had fi led to list 
the company on China’s mainland stock exchanges, in 
2011 and 2012 respectively.[26] The fi rst attempt was 
rejected by the China Security Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), the security market watchdog, over concerns 
about operational risk, low expenditure on research and 
development, and limited geographical presence. The 
second time, CSRC had imposed a freeze on all IPOs as 
the market was weak. 
 Therefore, Ding Hui was extremely eager to fl oat 
Nuoqi’s shares, and for the third time he planned to 
list Nuoqi on the Hong Kong stock exchange, which 
has a lower regulatory requirement than its mainland 
counterparts. In the eyes of Chinese entrepreneurs, the 
IPO has been seen as a symbol of ultimate success for a 
long time, as it could bring business owners many practical 
benefi ts. For example, a public company will have more 
access to China’s state-dominated banking system. 
 In order to make Nuoqi public, Ding Hui had to 
keep his business expanding at a considerable rate to 
meet regulatory requirements and, undoubtedly, the 
rapid expansion needed huge funding, particularly 
when the clothing industry had been declining due to 
the slowing economy and weak consumer sentiments.
[27] As a result, since bank loans were not adequate 
to fund the rapid expansion of Nuoqi’s business, Ding 
Hui borrowed heavily from private money lenders and 
investors – around 1.5 billion yuan (US$242 million), 
in the pre-IPO period.[28] After Ding Hui absconded, 
the municipal government of Quanzhou started to call 
his creditors to contact the authority and report their 
private lending. The combined value of private loans that 
has been reported so far amounts to approximately 400 
million yuan (US$64.56 million).[29] 
 Runaway bosses: A popular phenomenon 
 Ding Hui is not alone; an increasing number of Chinese 
bosses have run away to avoid debt collection. This is 
perceived as a widespread social phenomenon in China, 
where private lending crises have frequently occurred in 
recent years. In 2011, Wenzhou was the fi rst city in China to 
experience a severe credit crunch caused by underground 
private lending, and bosses started to fl ee the city, after 20 
per cent of Wenzhou’s 360,000 SMEs ceased operation 
owing to cash shortages.[30] Some successful capitalists, 
as well as small business owners, have left the city – such 
as Hu Fulin, the owner of Zhejiang Centre Group, a 
leading spectacles manufacturer.[31] From 2011 to 2014, 
‘runaway bosses’ cases have been constantly reported by 
the Chinese media, and it is normal for people to fi nd that 
entrepreneurs around them have ‘evaporated’ overnight. 
Particularly, 2014 was highlighted by the disappearance 
of several high-profi le entrepreneurs including, but not 
limited to, Ding Hui. 
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 For instance, according to  Global Times , Liao Rongna, 
the chairman of Guangxi-based private conglomerate 
Zhengling Group, fl ed the country in April 2014.[32] 
Established in 1982, Zhengling employs around 10,000 
employees and operates in several industries including 
automobile and machinery manufacturing, property 
development and fi nancial services. It is said that Liao 
Rongna and his family took part in illegal fundraising 
activities with more than 2,000 lenders involved, and in 
total he borrowed approximately seven billion yuan in 
bank loans (US$1.13 billion) and three billion yuan in 
private loans (US$0.48 billion), which is the largest case of 
its kind in south China’s Guangxi province.[33] Xinhua, 
China’s offi  cial news agency, reported that a cross-border 
manhunt has been underway for Liao Rongna since 
August 2014.[34] At the request of the Chinese judicial 
authority, the International Criminal Police Organisation 
(Interpol) issued red corner notices, the highest level of 
arrest warrant, for Liao and his wife, under the charge of 
“illegal absorbing of public funds”. 
 Moreover, in September 2014, the CFO of Ultrasonic 
AG, a Frankfurt-listed holding company of a large 
Chinese shoemaker, informed the company’s supervisory 
board that he had been unable to contact the CEO, Wu 
Qingyong, and the COO, Wu Minghong (father and son); 
and that most of the company’s cash reserves in mainland 
China and Hong Kong were gone.[35] Apparently, the 
disappearance of Ultrasonic’s CEO and COO had 
something to do with private lending. Consequently, 
the share price of Ultrasonic AG rapidly plummeted by 
around 70 per cent. 
 It is evident that the common denominator among 
China’s most fugitive bosses is private lending, an 
underground fi nancing mechanism for Chinese businesses. 
Therefore, the next section of this article will examine 
why private enterprises in China are heavily reliant on 
private lending to obtain funds, and how it has led to 
credit crises and runaway bosses in recent years. 
 The prevalence of private lending 
 Private lending refers to a widely employed fi nancing 
method by Chinese entrepreneurs who borrow money 
from relatives, friends, professional money lenders, or 
other ‘shadow banks’ to fund their business ventures. 
The term is interchangeable with ‘informal fi nance’ 
(also known as non-bank fi nancing activities).[36] This 
underground fi nancing mechanism is referred to as ‘back-
alley banking’ by Kellee Tsai, in contrast to China’s offi  cial 
banking system.[37] According to the Financial Stability 
Board’s defi nition, shadow banking means that: “the credit 
intermediation involving entities and activities outside the 
regular banking system”, so the private lending industry 
can be considered as an important component of China’s 
shadow banking system.[38] 
 In recent years, the non-bank lending market in 
China has evolved into a fully commercialised sector 
and professional money lenders and informal fi nancial 
intermediaries play a central role in the lending business. 
These intermediaries include guarantee companies, 
investment companies, pawn shops and underground 
money houses, which are either prohibited to engage in 
money lending by the authorities, or are not formally 
incorporated. However, the underground lenders are 
never amateurs and many of them hire a group of bankers, 
accountants and lawyers to operate the shadow banking 
business. Their business model is similar to formal banks 
in fi rst taking deposits from the public, and then making 
loans to capital-starved entrepreneurs. The return they 
promise for investors is often attractive compared to the 
saving rate off ered by state-owned banks, which struggle 
to beat the infl ation rate. As a result, they charge heavily on 
the interest of their private loans in order to compensate 
for the high fi nancing cost and make profi ts. It is reported 
that the annual interest rate of private loans normally 
ranges from 14 per cent to 70 per cent.[39] 
 The fi nancing dilemma of Chinese private businesses 
is largely a result of its state-run banking sector. Although 
a few private banks, such as Minsheng, do lend to small 
fi rms, the state-owned banks that dominate China’s 
banking arena prefer to lend to other, well-connected, 
state-owned enterprises.[40] One agricultural machine 
exporter told the  China Economic Weekly : “It is very diffi  cult 
for SMEs to get loans from banks, so they rely mostly on 
private lending for fi nancing. SMEs are neither able to 
have enough fi xed assets that can be used for mortgage, 
nor able to fi nd qualifi ed guarantors, so they often fail to 
meet strict standards set by banks”.[41] As a result, private 
enterprises that are refused by mainstream lenders are 
forced to turn to shadow banks for fi nancing. Currently, 
the majority of business ventures in China, from start-
ups to private conglomerates, are heavily dependent on 
private lending for raising funds, and it is common for 
business tycoons (like Ding Hui) to borrow private loans. 
 The popularity of private lending should not be 
underestimated. According to the People’s Bank of China, 
its central bank, 89 per cent of households and 59 per cent 
of enterprises in Wenzhou have taken part in private 
lending activities.[42] Since private lending operates 
outside the realm of China’s formal lending industry, it is 
currently almost unregulated by the state. Therefore, no 
one knows the exact size of this underground market due 
to the lack of offi  cial data. However, some organisations 
have estimated its enormous scale. According to Credit 
Suisse the total outstanding loans in China’s underground 
lending market stood at four trillion yuan (US$ 644.8 
billion) in 2012.[43] Moreover, a recent study by China’s 
Southwest University of Finance and Economics has 
estimated the total market volume of informal fi nance at 
fi ve trillion yuan (US$ 806 billion).[44] 
 Money supply and demand 
 The fact that private lending has developed into a fi nancial 
market worth trillions of yuan can be briefl y explained by 
the demand and supply of funding. From the demand side, 
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the revival of private enterprise in China from the late 
1970s has called for a great amount of capital to fund new 
business ventures. In 1978, China started a series of market-
oriented reforms guided by the well-known policy,  gai ge 
kai fang (reform and opening up), after its economy had 
stagnated for three decades under the Communist party’s 
centrally planned economic system. As the state plan gave 
way to the market discipline, the Chinese population 
started to set up private businesses and pursue personal 
wealth, leading to a rapid expansion of China’s economy. 
The country experienced unprecedented economic 
growth from 1978 to 2012, which is demonstrated by the 
average 9.8 per cent annual increase in gross domestic 
product (GDP).[45] In 2010, China surpassed Japan as the 
world’s second-largest economy, after the US. 
 There is no denying that the real driving force behind 
the Chinese economy is the development of private 
enterprises that account for 60 per cent of the country’s 
economic output and most job opportunities. However, 
the diffi  culty of obtaining loans from state-owned lenders 
has always been a nightmare for Chinese entrepreneurs. 
According to Professor Wang Yijiang, only 20 per cent 
of fi nancial resources in China are used by SMEs.[46] 
It means most major lender credits are granted to other 
state-owned enterprises or few privately owned business 
giants. Therefore, as the funding demand of the growing 
private sector cannot be satisfi ed by the formal banking 
sector, Chinese entrepreneurs have to rely on shadow 
lenders to fi ll the fi nancing gaps. 
 On the other hand, from the money-supply side, the 
accumulation of private wealth in China has contributed 
suffi  cient funds to the prosperity of the money lending 
industry. Compared to investors in developed economies, 
Chinese residents have a limited choice of investments 
owing to the underdeveloped capital market. China 
is regarded as a country with one of the highest saving 
rates, with a saving to income ratio of 40 per cent.[47] 
Nonetheless, the interest rate for bank deposits (the 
nominal rate minus the infl ation rate) has remained 
negative for many years, which means Chinese savers are 
actually losing money on every yuan they put in banks.
[48] As a result, a large number of households that have 
abundant savings are seeking a way to increase returns 
on their money and private lending has become a good 
investment option as it can generate considerably high 
returns.[49] What is more, due to China’s slowing economy 
following the global fi nancial crisis, an increasing number 
of entrepreneurs, especially those who are running export-
oriented or manufacturing businesses, have diverted their 
money into the lending industry to increase profi t. Some 
state-owned enterprises have also joined the lucrative 
money lending business, using their cash reserves to lend 
to other companies short of money.[50] 
 While cash-strapped businessmen have called for more 
funding, the amassment of private wealth and limited 
investment choices have resulted in large sums of money 
being made available for investment. Therefore, private 
lending has become a thriving industry in China, and 
currently many Chinese enterprises are either partly 
or fully funded by private loans. A businessman from 
Wenzhou talked about the prosperity of underground 
fi nancing in his city, saying that there are around 100,000 
people in Wenzhou, each of whom is able to raise one 
billion yuan (US$161.2 million) within 48 hours.[51] 
Given this liquidity, entrepreneurs can obtain capital 
without resorting to borrowing from state-owned banks. 
Private lending is no doubt benefi cial for the development 
of China’s private economy, but it also comes at a price. 
 Credit crisis and fugitive bosses 
 Due to the double-digit growth of the Chinese economy 
over the past three decades, the private lending business 
has been a win-win solution for both capital-starved 
entrepreneurs and greedy lenders. On one hand, most 
entrepreneurs have obtained adequate capital from 
private fi nancing to fund their ventures and thus enjoyed 
substantial growth as the economy has soared. In the past, 
huge profi t margins generated by thriving businesses 
could easily off set the high cost of private lending. On 
the other hand, investors have also earned a considerable 
return by fi nancing the money lenders. 
 However, more recently, the year-on-year GDP growth 
rate in the fi rst quarter of 2015 was only seven per cent – 
the lowest level since the crisis in 2009.[52] Owing to 
weakening demand for Chinese goods in the post-crisis 
era, a number of industries, particularly manufacturers and 
exporters, have found themselves in a diffi  cult fi nancial 
situation. The property market, which powers nearly a 
fi fth of the economy, has reached the end of a decade long 
boom, with house prices falling six per cent in the past 
year, the steepest drop since records began.[53] Under 
these economic circumstances, defaults in the private 
lending market have become quite common, as borrowers 
fi nd themselves unable to repay expensive private loans. 
The shortage of cash fl ows has led to the insolvency of 
thousands of private enterprises. 
 When the private lending bubble fi nally burst in 2011, 
many regions in China witnessed a widespread lending 
crisis, particularly Wenzhou city. In March 2011, the 
monthly rate of private lending in Wenzhou peaked at 
15.38 per cent, with some loans having an annual rate 
of more than 180 per cent.[54] In August 2011, the 
lending crisis hit, and an increasing number of borrowers 
were unable to repay their interests to lenders. Therefore, 
thousands of businesses failed and lending defaults became 
prevalent. Between August 2011 and May 2012, the 
Wenzhou courts received around 22,000 cases regarding 
private loans, and the total amount involved in disputes 
was 21 billion yuan (US$3.39 billion).[55] According to 
Fujian High Court, in the fi rst six months of 2014, the 
number of cases heard relating to private lending within 
the Fujian Province (a prosperous region with a well-
developed private economy) had reached a record high 
of 37,000.[56] 
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 In order to evade their debt, a large number of 
entrepreneurs across China were reportedly deserting 
their companies and factories taking whatever they 
could and hiding elsewhere. Some of them have even 
fl ed abroad, leaving behind unpaid workers and creditors. 
In 2014, the phenomenon of runaway bosses reached 
its peak as more high-profi le entrepreneurs disappeared, 
including chairmen and CEOs of public companies such 
as those discussed in the fi rst section of this article. 
 The absence of regulation 
 The laws and regulations concerning private lending 
are neither coherent nor suffi  cient. The current rules 
regulating private loans are spread over various pieces 
of legislation including property law, contract law, 
security law, criminal law and judicial interpretations.
[57] Generally speaking, private loans are contractual 
relationships between lenders and borrowers, so their 
transactions mostly remain outside state intervention, 
except for complying with a few provisions in private 
and public laws. In China’s contract law code, there is an 
entire chapter regarding loan contracts that sets out basic 
requirements for the formation and content of lending 
agreements to be followed by all money lenders.[58] If 
borrowers are asked to provide securities and pledges for 
private loans, they are subject to the People’s Republic of 
China Guaranty Law 1995. As for the interest rate, China’s 
supreme courts have imposed a limitation on the interest 
rate of private loans, which should not exceed four times 
that of bank loans for the same period.[59] 
 However, there is no authority responsible for the 
enforcement of regulations. Who the regulatory body for 
private lending should be, and its powers and obligations, 
remains uncertain. While some local governments have 
authorised their fi nancial aff airs offi  ces to deal with the 
lending crisis, China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC), the banking watchdog, has also tried to step in 
as it has administrative power over all lending businesses. 
As a result, no body is accountable for supervising this 
enormous market. This exacerbates issues when borrowers 
are unable to repay their debts, and money lenders in turn 
cannot fulfi l their obligations to their own investors. The 
lack of a regulatory body makes local courts in China the 
 de facto regulators, with judges at the front line tackling 
private lending disputes. 
 Furthermore, when the market crashes, such as when a 
large group of investors has suff ered great losses due to a 
wave of defaults, the Chinese authorities tend to solve the 
problem by over-punishing some borrowers. There are 
several criminal off ences relating to private lending, such 
as re-lending at higher interest rate, illegally absorbing 
public deposits and fraudulent fundraising.[60] The law 
has imposed severe sanctions on illegal lending activities; 
in particular, someone suspected of fraudulent fundraising 
can be sentenced to life imprisonment or the death 
penalty in some cases. However, the line between legal 
and illegal lending is blurred, providing great discretional 
powers to the Chinese courts, which can be aff ected by 
the government. 
 We will take the cases of Zeng Chengjie and Wu 
Ying as examples. Zeng Chengjie, a property developer 
from South China’s Hunan province, was found guilty of 
illegally raising money in 2013. He was known as ‘China’s 
Bernie Madoff ’ in the state media, as he reportedly 
defrauded thousands of individual investors of billions of 
yuan.[61] From 2003 to 2008, in order to raise capital for 
developing new property projects, he privately borrowed 
3.45 billion yuan (US$556 million) from thousands of 
investors in his city, promising annual returns from 20 to 
120 per cent.[62] However, as his company encountered 
poor sales in 2008, he began to default on the sums owed 
to a large number of investors. This led to a social crisis 
as investors implored the local authorities to help them 
reclaim their money. After the fi rst and second instance of 
criminal trials in the Hunan province, the Supreme Court 
found Zeng Chengjie guilty of ‘fraudulent fundraising’, 
and he was executed in 2013. 
 Wu Ying is a young multimillionaire from the Zhejiang 
Province. According to her indictment, between 2005 
and 2007, she illegally raised 770 million yuan (US$124 
million) from 11 people with the promise of unreasonably 
high interest rates.[63] The money she borrowed was 
used to repay old debts, pay for interest, buy luxurious 
cars and personal spending. She was sentenced to death 
under the fraudulent fundraising charge in her fi rst and 
second instance trials, in 2009 and 2012. There was public 
debate about her case throughout its duration. Many legal 
professionals and members of the general public did not 
consider Wu Ying to be guilty, as they regarded what she 
had done to be no more than informal fi nancing, which 
is simply private lending without bank involvement.[64] 
The Supreme Court in China upheld the guilty verdict 
but referred her for a retrial in her home province of 
Zhejiang, taking her off  death row.[65] 
 Why private lending accounts 
for fugitive bosses 
 People have been wondering why an increasing number 
of Chinese entrepreneurs choose to run away rather than 
fi le for insolvency. Without a doubt, sudden disappearance 
is an indecent and illegal behaviour which leaves behind 
unpaid workers, angry creditors and deserted companies. 
Some legal, economic and cultural contributing factors 
are considered in the remainder of this article. 
 First, due to the uncertain legal status of private loans, 
they do not appear in the balance sheet of a formal 
business. Therefore, businessmen often borrow under 
their own names and then invest the borrowed money in 
their enterprises. Thus, entrepreneurs are personally liable 
for all private debts, even though the money is actually 
used by their companies, which are separate legal entities. 
Moreover, China currently has no personal insolvency 
regime, so individuals who are unable to repay private loans 
cannot claim bankruptcy in order to release them from 
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their debts. As a result they are permanently responsible 
for giving back money to underground lenders. 
 Second, the severe punishment under Chinese 
criminal law can make running away an attractive option. 
As mentioned, the illegal fundraising activities results in 
criminal off ences that are subject to harsh punishments by 
Western standards. In particular, the off ence of ‘fraudulent 
fundraising’ is often employed by Chinese judges to 
punish private fi nancing practices, and the two cases of 
Zeng Chengjie and Wu Ying demonstrate the severity 
of punishment. When certain entrepreneurs become 
insolvent and are unable to repay a large group of creditors, 
which might have a negative impact on economic and 
social stability, Chinese judges will ruthlessly impose a 
criminal off ence on such borrowers. 
 Third, Chinese money lenders, like any loan sharks, 
are adept at employing coercive methods for illegal debt 
collection, because it is impossible for them to rely on the 
legal system to protect their business and profi ts. Therefore, 
insolvent entrepreneurs and their families are exposed to 
the risk of being blackmailed, illegally detained or even 
assaulted, and it is likely that their personal property will 
be disposed of by lenders in an illegal manner. According 
to the Jiangsu High Court, in the Wujiang District of 
Suzhou, approximately 80 per cent of recent criminal 
cases of illegal detentions are related to debt collection 
activities through private lending.[66] Therefore, illegal 
debt collection sometimes forces entrepreneurs to leave 
their businesses and home towns to protect themselves 
and their property. 
 Finally, there is an old saying in China,  zou wei shang ce , 
which can be roughly translated, as ‘running away is the 
best strategy’. This proverb originated during China’s 
ancient wartime and it means if the current situation is 
to your disadvantage in a battle, the best thing to do is to 
leave. It is clear that modern entrepreneurs in China still 
stick to the wisdom of their ancestors. Owing to a large 
amount of private loans that are nearly impossible to repay, 
entrepreneurs fi nd themselves in a vulnerable position in 
that they not only face potentially severe sanctions from 
the state, but are also susceptible to violent debt collections 
from money lenders. However, if fugitive bosses manage 
to abscond with as much money as possible, as Ding Hui 
has done, they are able to restart their lives in oversees 
countries that have no extradition treaty with China, 
such as the US, Canada and Australia. Undoubtedly, 
the economic cost of running away is the lowest of the 
available options and is often viewed as the optimal choice 
for Chinese entrepreneurs in fi nancial diffi  culty. 
 The pilot fi nancial reform 
 The problems of limited investment and funding 
opportunities have existed in China for several years, 
which has unavoidably led to the prevalence of private 
lending that channels spare capital from investors to 
entrepreneurs. However, due to the lack of regulation, the 
underground lending market in China has encountered 
frequent credit crises since 2011. It has caused thousands 
of business insolvencies and ‘vanishing bosses’, which has 
had a detrimental impact on economic and social stability. 
 As a governmental response, China has been exploring 
eff ective approaches to regulate private lending as well 
as to solve the fi nancial puzzle for small businesses. In 
March 2012, the policymaker in Beijing initiated a series 
of fi nancial reforms that established a pilot reform zone 
in Wenzhou.[67] The state council set out 12 general 
objectives for fi nancial reform and, undoubtedly, putting 
creditors and debtors in the private lending market into 
an offi  cially controlled framework was top of the list.
[68] The reason for choosing Wenzhou as the starting 
point for the reform is self-evident, as the city has been 
considered as an entrepreneurial hub and it has a huge 
shadow-banking network. According to one estimate, the 
scale of Wenzhou’s shadow banking system amounted to 
110 billion yuan (US$17.73 billion) which is equivalent 
to 38 per cent of its GDP.[69] 
 Wenzhou private fi nancing regulation 
 Accordingly, the People’s Congress in Zhejiang, the 
provincial legislator, has passed China’s fi rst fi nancial 
regulation regarding private lending. The ‘Wenzhou 
Private Financing Regulation’ came into eff ect on 1 
March 2014 and is regarded as a great breakthrough in 
legalising and regulating private fi nancing activities.
[70] The regulation has seven chapters and 50 articles, 
and enables private businesses to raise money through 
three types of private fi nancing: private lending, private 
placement bonds and private equity. For the purposes 
of this article, we will focus on private lending, which is 
covered in chapter 3 of the regulation. In addition, the 
Wenzhou government has produced detailed rules for 
implementing the regulation. Generally speaking, the 
regulatory regime is based on the compulsory registration 
of private loans that meet certain standards. Several 
lending service centres to promote and facilitate private 
fi nancing activities have also been established. 
 According to article 12(1) of the regulation, private 
lending for commercial purposes can be used as a fi nancing 
method between individuals, or between individuals 
and non-fi nancial enterprises, or between non-fi nancial 
enterprises (temporary lending only).[71] Article 12(1) 
plays a key part as it confi rms the legitimate status of 
private lending as a fi nancing mechanism for businessmen 
and enterprises. It should be noted that private lending 
agreements between two non-fi nancial enterprises should 
be temporary, as any enterprise that lends frequently 
should obtain a license from the fi nancial regulator. The 
implementing rule clarifi es that such temporary lending 
between two enterprises should not exceed three months.
[72] Moreover, private lending should be conducted 
 privately , as the new regulation prohibits private fi nancing 
parties from advertising it to the public through newspaper, 
radio, television, internet, public lectures, seminars, leafl ets 
and mobile phone text messages.[73] 
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 Regulatory agencies 
 In the past, the lack of a named regulatory authority 
has caused great chaos, but the new regulation aims to 
rectify this situation. It authorises the Wenzhou municipal 
government and other county-level governments within 
the city to regulate private fi nancing activities.[74] 
More specifi cally, fi nancial aff airs offi  ces and fi nancial 
management departments in local governments provide 
guidance on the regulation and supervise private fi nancing 
activities within their respective administrative regions.
[75] Apparently, it is better to have local authorities, rather 
than national fi nancial regulators, to supervise private 
lending as underground lending businesses are normally 
regional, and any potential risks will be confi ned to that 
region. The Wenzhou branches of national fi nancial 
regulatory authorities, such as the central bank or 
banking and security regulators, have the power to guide 
the supervisory work of local fi nancial management 
departments.[76] 
 Lending service centres 
 According to the new regulation, the Wenzhou local 
government shall set up “private fi nancing public service 
centres” to facilitate lending activities. The lending service 
centres provide a variety of lending-related services 
for individuals and enterprises that take part in private 
fi nancing transactions. For example: 
•  Providing civil attestation for private fi nancing 
activities; 
•  Providing training courses for staff  in the private 
fi nancing industry; 
•  Off ering investment consulting services; 
•  Facilitating the assignment of creditors’ rights; and 
•  Attracting other service bodies, such as notary offi  ces, 
guarantee companies, law fi rms and accounting fi rms, 
to open branches in the public service centres so as 
to provide support services for private fi nancing.[77]  
 In addition, lending service centres can be entrusted by 
local fi nancial management departments to carry out 
some regulatory tasks, including: 
•  Publishing information on the private fi nancing 
interest rate index; 
•  Collecting and analysing private fi nancing data, risk 
monitoring and risk assessment; 
•  Establishing private fi nancing credit records and 
tracking money usage and loan performances; 
•  Receiving private lending registrations; and 
•  Other items entrusted by local fi nancial management 
departments.[78]  
 Compulsory written format 
 The regulation requires that there must be a written 
and executed contract between lending parties.[79] It 
has made written format compulsory for creditors and 
debtors, which has had a positive impact in reducing 
disputes caused by the uncertainty of non-written 
agreements. Previously, China’s contract law allowed 
private lending contracts between natural persons to 
be conducted without a written contract, permitting 
oral agreement in lending practices.[80] Therefore, it is 
not unusual for lenders to hand over millions of yuan 
to borrowers without signing an agreement, since asking 
for written contracts can sometimes be viewed as distrust 
among close business partners. However, when it comes 
to disputes, the oral contract is not valid as evidence. 
 Source of funding: Self-owned capitals 
 In terms of lenders’ sources of funding, the new regulation 
says that they have to use their self-owned capital or 
savings to fi nance loans.[81] As a result, it will be illegal for 
lenders to absorb funds from the public or borrow money 
from banks, and then relend that money to borrowers at a 
higher price, which is currently common practice. Money 
lenders often secure deposits from the public by promising 
an attractive return which is much higher than the interest 
rate off ered by banks, so investors’ money constitutes the 
majority of money lenders’ capital pools and increases the 
leverage of the lending business. It not only helps lenders 
to make more money, but also leads to increased credit 
risks when defaults occur. Therefore, when borrowers fail 
to repay the money lender, the money lender is likely 
to default on their own investors, so the entire lending 
chain collapses – the domino eff ect. Besides, some money 
lenders, who have access to the state-owned banking 
sector, can make easy money by relending bank credits to 
cash-strapped entrepreneurs, which might cause systemic 
risks in the whole fi nancial system as the default of private 
loans will trigger the default of bank loans. As the new 
regulation prohibits money lenders to solicit public 
money or borrow bank loans, those potential risks will 
be eliminated. 
 Interest rate 
 To determine private lending interest the regulation 
states that the lending rate shall be negotiated between 
the lender and the borrower, as long as it complies with 
relevant regulations.[82] This article formally confi rms 
the legitimacy of charging interest in private lending 
transactions. At present, there is an interest rate cap for 
private lending in China, a judicial interpretation made 
by China’s Supreme Court, requiring that the interest 
rate for private lending should not exceed four times 
the interest rate of bank loans for the same period of 
time.[83] Accordingly, the benchmark interest rate for 
a one-year bank loan in China is 5.1 per cent, so the 
corresponding interest rate cap for a one-year private 
loan is 20.4 per cent. 
 In practice, a large number of money lenders who 
often charge interest rates beyond the state’s restriction, 
have found some methods to evade the cap. For instance, 
they might deduct the excessive interest from the 
principal directly when they give money to borrowers. 
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Moreover, money lenders might fi nd someone else to be 
a middleman for the lending transaction, and ask him or 
her to charge a brokerage fee that is actually a part of the 
interest. In order to protect borrowers from unfair lending 
practices, the new regulation bans lenders from deducting 
any interest from the principle in advance, ensuring that 
the repayment of the debt is based on the actual amount 
received by the borrower.[84] 
 Recording system for private loans 
 The highlight of the new regulation is the creation of an 
innovative registration-based system to supervise private 
lending. It has imposed an obligation on borrowers 
to submit a copy of the contract to the local fi nancial 
management department or other commissioned lending 
service centres within 15 days of signing the agreement. 
This enables them to record the relevant lending 
transaction, when any of the following standards are met: 
•  A single private loan worth more than three million 
yuan (US$ 483,600); 
•  The borrower’s loan balance regarding private lending 
exceeds ten million yuan (US$1.61 million); 
•  The borrower borrows money from more than 30 
individuals and/or enterprises;[85] 
 For the remaining private lending transactions, lenders 
and borrowers are encouraged to report their loans to the 
authority on a voluntary basis.[86] 
 Although the duty of reporting relies on borrowers of 
the relevant private loans, lenders have the responsibility 
to supervise borrowers’ activities, and are entitled to 
register loans if borrowers have not done so.[87] If there 
are major changes concerning the lending amount, the 
loan period or the interest rate, borrowers must report 
relevant changes to the regulator within 15 days.[88] The 
regulator also encourages lending parties to report loan 
performance situations to the authority, which will be 
incorporated in the newly established private fi nancing 
credit system.[89] 
 Furthermore, the private lending regulator in 
Wenzhou has also established an online recording system 
to make it convenient for debtors and creditors to fi le 
lending contracts. Borrowers only need to register an 
online account, complete the application form and 
upload relevant documents, then the lending transaction 
will be verifi ed and recorded by lending service centres. 
Clearly, the online reporting system is favourable to local 
businessmen, as more than 50 per cent of private loans 
related to project fi nancing are recorded by the online 
system.[90] 
 Incentives for compliance 
 The new regulation stipulates several incentives for lenders 
and borrowers to report their private loans. Generally 
speaking, it asks the local government to provide policy 
support to those who are responsible for reporting.[91] It 
is evident that registering private loans with the authority 
is benefi cial for both lenders and borrowers. For lenders, 
the registration material will be regarded as evidence with 
high probative force when courts and arbitration bodies 
within the Zhejiang province are hearing cases relating 
to private lending.[92] Therefore, lenders are free from 
the burden of proof, which can protect their interests and 
rights signifi cantly. 
 For borrowers, the registration of private loans exempts 
them from conducting illegal fundraising activities that 
are regarded as a severe criminal off ence in China, because 
the regulator will admit the legitimacy of the private 
loans that have been reported. Moreover, the information 
recorded about loan performance can be used for the 
credit rating of the borrower, which will be shared by 
all fi nancial institutions.[93] It can motivate borrowers 
to perform the duty of reporting, as the information 
accumulated in China’s personal credit system enables 
them to have more access to the formal banking system 
in the future. 
 Legal liabilities 
 If anyone violates the regulation, or the existing laws 
and administrative regulations already laid down by 
the relevant legal liabilities, the existing rules shall be 
followed.[94] Therefore, borrowers should be aware of 
the existing administrative punishments and criminal 
off ences and avoid activities such as illegally absorbing 
public deposits and fraudulent fundraising. The new 
regulation has already resulted in fi nes being imposed 
on those who fail to perform their reporting duties. If 
the borrower in a private lending agreement fails to 
fulfi l the reporting obligation or provides false materials, 
the local fi nancial authority will order the borrower 
to correct this within a specifi ed time limit. If the 
borrower does not make corrections within that period, 
the private lending activity shall be publicised, and the 
borrower will be fi ned between 10,000 and 50,000 yuan 
(US$1,6118,055) for an individual, or between 30,000 
and 100,000 yuan (US$4,83316,110) for enterprises or 
other organisations.[95] 
 Wenzhou private fi nancing index 
 In addition to the latest regulation, the Wenzhou 
municipal government has launched a new index, 
called the ‘Wenzhou Private Financing Index’ (the 
Wenzhou Index), to track the interest rate levels of 
private fi nancing activities.[96] The new index has been 
constructed with rigorous statistical methods, which can 
refl ect the level, tendency and fl uctuation of the price 
of private fi nancing. The compilation and release of 
the index is a key step in the pilot for fi nancial reform, 
as the government aims to build an indicator for the 
regional lending market, and promote the transparency 
of transactions, as well as increasing the effi  ciency of the 
allocation of fi nancial resources. Currently, the index 
has a local version for the Wenzhou city and a national 
version for the whole country. The local version was 
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offi  cially released on 7 December 2012, and the Index 
has been updated on a daily basis since 1 January 2013.
[97] The national version of the Wenzhou Index was 
published on 26 September 2013.[98] The Wenzhou 
Index has established a cooperative relationship with 
Thomson Reuters and the China Securities Index, 
which publishes the well-known CSI 300 Index, to help 
it to compile and publish data. 
 In terms of data sources, the local version is 
compiled by Wenzhou’s fi nancial aff airs offi  ce based 
on data collected from nearly 400 monitoring sites 
across the city. The monitoring sites include private 
lending service centres, private capital management 
companies, microcredit companies, rural mutual fi nancial 
cooperatives, certain enterprises, pawn shops and credit 
guarantee companies. Clearly, it covers a variety of forms 
focusing on private fi nancing outside the formal banking 
sector. On average, approximately 300 samples from real 
transactions are collected daily, to ensure a relatively high 
level of authenticity and timeliness. The national version 
is compiled based on data collected from more than 200 
monitoring sites in 22 Chinese cities. The Wenzhou 
Index can be divided/categorised into periods of one, 
three, six, 12 and in excess of 12 months. 
 Table 2:  The Wenzhou Index (May 18, 2015) 
Wenzhou Private Lending Comprehensive Interest Index 19.17
Divided by 
entity
Private lending 
service centres
Small-credit 
companies
Private capital management 
companies
Direct 
lending
Other 
entities
Rural 
ROSCAs
16.02 17.35 18.00 15.52 26.29 11.43
Divided by 
time 
1 month 3 months 6 months 1 year More than 1 year
18.53 16.30 15.59 15.50 18.26
Notes 1. All indexes refer to annualised interest rate.
2. ROSCAs is the abbreviation for rotating savings and credit associations.
 Data Source :  Wenzhou Private Financing Index Offi  cial Website.[99] 
 Implementation results 
 The Wenzhou Private Financing Regulation has been 
in eff ect for more than a year. As the fi rst fi nancial 
legislation regarding private fi nancing in China, its birth 
has been perceived as an important breakthrough for 
the standardisation and legalisation of private lending 
activities. According to offi  cial data, during the fi rst year 
of implementation from March 2014 to March 2015, 
there were 7,054 private loans in Wenzhou being reported 
to the authority, with a combined value of 9.88 billion 
yuan (US$1.59 billion).[100] On average, the amount of 
each loan is around 1.4million yuan (US$225,540), and 
the annualised interest rate is approximately 16.1 per cent. 
It is clear that the registration of private loans with the 
regulator has become one indispensable step for the 
entire lending procedure, which has gradually moved 
private lending in Wenzhou from underground to the 
mainstream. According to Wenzhou Intermediate People’s 
Court, the implementation of the regulation has had a 
positive impact on reducing private lending disputes, 
as the court system in Wenzhou received 15,009 cases 
regarding private lending in 2014, which is a year-on-year 
reduction of 9.81 per cent. .[101] The Wenzhou Index has 
provided important guidance for lenders and borrowers in 
deciding the interest rate for lending transactions. As the 
Wenzhou reform has proved to be successful in regulating 
the private lending market, more than 15 provinces in 
China, including Guangdong, Shandong, Hunan, Sichuan 
and Guizhou, have been trying to learn from Wenzhou 
and have already set up 77 lending service centres across 
the country to test the registration-based regulatory 
system.[102] However, even though an increasing number 
of lenders and borrowers have started to comply with the 
new regulation, some business owners still have concerns 
over the exposure/loss of privacy to the authority, paying 
additional taxes, and so on. 
 Conclusion 
 When people talk about China as the world’s second-
largest economy, they pay most attention to the double-
digit GDP growth, large state-owned enterprises 
listed in the Fortune Global 500 or, more recently, the 
internationalisation of the Chinese yuan. However, the 
fi nancing diffi  culties of millions of privately owned 
businesses, which have been the real driving force behind 
the Chinese economy, are often overlooked. Therefore, 
this article has demonstrated how Chinese entrepreneurs 
depend largely on private lending to obtain capital for 
their business ventures, which has resulted in credit 
crunches and runaway bosses over the past few years; 
while the growth of the Chinese economy has gradually 
slowed down. In 2014, the disappearance of several 
high-profi le entrepreneurs, which included chairmen 
and CEOs of public companies, attracted extensive 
media coverage. 
 In response, the Chinese authorities have launched 
a series of fi nancial reforms aimed at supervising the 
rampant lending market and alleviating the funding 
diffi  culties of private companies. A pilot reform zone has 
been established in Wenzhou, and the local legislature 
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came up with a new registration-based regulatory regime 
for private lending. After one year of experimentation, the 
overall result seems satisfactory for the new regulation, 
which is aimed at being benefi cial to both lenders and 
borrowers, and more local authorities in other provinces 
are working to replicate Wenzhou’s example. Hopefully, 
private lending under the offi  cially controlled framework, 
can be utilised to serve the sustainable growth of China’s 
dynamic private economy. 
 Lerong Lu, Researcher, School of Law, University of Leeds 
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 Turning the compliance straitjacket into a 
bulletproof vest 
 In the last few years, several banks have received some 
of the largest fi nes ever issued by regulators as a result of 
manipulating systemically important interest benchmarks 
(SIIB) – think LIBOR and EURIBOR – and the 
Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) mis-selling scandal 
has cost a number of banks more than £18 billion. People 
across industries are defi nitely aware of, and thinking 
about, regulation and compliance. 
 The latest Timetric industry report on Governance, 
Risk and Compliance (GRC) in the UK has indicated 
that the regulatory landscape is tightening, so fi nancial 
institutions need to continue to be alert and leverage 
all possible avenues to ensure they are compliant. With 
Solvency II expected to be implemented in the UK from 
1 January 2016, there are even more risk management 
standards for companies to get to grips with. 
 This is why demand for enterprise GRC solutions 
is growing. Risk management is playing an especially 
important role in industries where management of 
Big Data is crucial, such as companies involved in grid 
computing, fi nancial services, network security and cloud 
services. These companies face growing business risks 
from an increasing number of data breaches and security 
thefts, such as cyber attacks. 
 However, as recent events have shown, any company 
holding customer data – whether it is a telco company 
like Talk Talk, or Marks and Spencer – is at risk. Such 
data breaches can destroy confi dential information and 
business processes within seconds, and can cause massive 
fi nancial losses as well as public disgrace. Thus there is 
a tremendous reputational risk. There are already calls 
for regulators to be given signifi cant new powers to 
tackle the escalating problem of online fraud in the 
wake of the cyberattack that potentially compromised 
the security of millions of TalkTalk customers, but what 
can the companies themselves do to avoid these kinds of 
situations? 
 A risk-based approach 
 Two years ago, the Financial Services Authority was 
replaced by two new regulatory bodies, the Prudential 
Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct 
Authority, which increased GCR requirements across 
the board, but demand for an industry shift towards more 
proactivity and transparency from fi nancial institutions is 
not only coming from the regulators. Consumers want 
to ensure the banks with which they have entrusted their 
fi nancial stability are not culpable. 
